


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DUAL FUNCTIONS OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES

BY

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
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DUAL FUNCTIONS OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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U.S. Army War College
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ABSTRACT

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Since its foundation the Indonesian Armed Forces (IAF) have regarded themselves as a political and as a military force. Lacking professional training and low in modern armaments, Indonesian resistance took the form of guerrilla warfare in which there was no clear boundary between military and civilian life. They were organized into politically aligned irregular units as well as regular army forces and military leaders performed political functions as well as military role.

The IAF molded the youths from the former Dutch Colonial Army (KNIL), the Japanese trained army (PETA) and those who had taken up arms in the irregular units (LASKAR) to become the Armed Forces Founding Fathers with differences in background and intentions. The nationalist movements that influenced the youth movements in that period also molded the way of thinking of the founding fathers who in the future justified their continuing role in the political arena. The military claimed their right to continuous representation in the government, legislature and administration. At a seminar in 1965 the army produced a doctrine that declared the IAF had a dual function role both as a Military Force and as a Social-Political Force.

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DUAL FUNCTIONS OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Do not ever lose and surrender the freedom that we had fought and defended, to whoever will try to conquer and rule us.¹

General Sudirman
21 July 1947

General.

Since its founding the Indonesian Armed Forces (IAF) have regarded themselves as a political and as a military force, and for most of their history they have indeed played a major political role. During the first few years of full independence, the IAF saw themselves in an essentially guardian role, and later asserted the right to participate more fully in political life.

The IAF's perception of itself as a political force arose during the war against the Dutch which its very nature was a struggle for independence which was political as well as military. Some of the youths who took up arms against the Dutch were less motivated by the desire for a military career than by patriotism that expressed itself in support of the Republic. The character of fighting further strengthened the military's concern for political matters.

Lacking professional training and low in modern armaments, Indonesian resistance took the form of guerrilla warfare in which there was no clear boundary between military and civilian life. The active fighters were heavily dependent on the support of local population. Because the guerrilla fighters were organized into politically aligned irregular units as well as regular army forces, military leaders performed political functions as well as

military functions. In many cases the role of political and military leaders, became almost indistinguishable.

The absence of an apolitical military tradition made it easier for army officers to accept their role during the revolution. The pressing need for quick mobilization of a large fighting force to fight for independence left no opportunity for a gradual growth of a professional army built around the nucleus of young officers from the former Dutch Colonial Army (KNIL). The small group of academy trained officers in the new Indonesian National Army (TNI) was heavily outnumbered by youths who had received military training in auxiliary military organizations set up by the Japanese Occupation Army (PETA) and by those who had taken up arms in the irregular units (LASKAR), formed spontaneously throughout the country in the months after the proclamation of independence.

In contrast with western ideals that the army should be politically neutral indoctrinated in the Dutch military academies, the PETA officers trained by the Japanese saw no particular objection to being involved in politics, and the youths who had joined the LASKAR units often did so as a member of a political organization.

In the period immediately after the transfer of sovereignty at the end of 1949, the IAF accepted the principle of civilian supremacy and its officers assumed a role on the edge of political life. As the weakness of the parliamentary system became increasingly obvious, the officers bore the responsibility to intervene to save the Nation: "Maintain the integrity of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) and the Armed Forces (ABRI). Do not let any political party rule and dominate the Indonesian National Army (TNI)."²

To justify the IAF's continuing role in political functions after the initial crisis had passed, the then Army Chief of Staff, MG A. H. Nasution

formulated the concept of "Dual Function" (DWI Fungsi) according to which the army would neither seek to take over the government nor remain politically inactive. The military claimed the right to continuous representation in the government, legislature and administration. At a seminar held in April 1965, the army produced a doctrine that declared the IAF had a "dual function" role both as a Military Force and as a Social-Political Force. As a Social Political force the activities covered are: ideological, political, social, economic, cultural and religious.

The IAF dual function cannot be separated from Indonesian history nor from National political culture. The wide spread of islands that constitute Indonesia meant that a variety of customs, cultures, languages and religions had to be molded together as the Indonesian society and this is described in the motto of the Indonesian coat of arms "Unity in Diversity" (Bhineka Tunggal Ika).

A good political system is a system that visualizes the social system. Furthermore the Western Democratic parliamentary system, which is considered as an excellent system, apparently resulted in a political disorder and failure in parts of Asia and Africa. It produced a political system different from the western system, due to each country's social and political culture. For Indonesia, the dual function of the Armed Forces were born in that environment.

Purpose.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the dual function of the Indonesian Armed Forces (IAF) as a military and as a social-political force.

Outline.

This paper is organized as follows:

- o Chapter I: Introduction.
- o Chapter II: History of Indonesia.
- o Chapter III: The Indonesian National Army (TNI).
- o Chapter IV: The Dual Functions.
- o Chapter V: Conclusion.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF INDONESIA

General.

Indonesia consists of five main islands, Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Irian Jaya (West Irian). There are 30 other smaller islands such as Ambon, Timor, Morotai, Lombok and Bali. Totally, there are about 17,667 islands and islets of which only 6,000 are inhabited. It may be the largest archipelago in the world but it is geographically unintegrated separated by sea, unlike the American continent which consists of a massive landmass where the people can travel anywhere freely on land.

Its area is estimated about 5,193 KM². Total land territory is 2,207 KM², spread over water area of more than 3,166 KM². The country forms a crossroads between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. It bridges two continents, the mainland Asia and Australia. It is a strategic area that controls important sea lines of communications that can accommodate big ships such as oil tankers through the Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait, Makassar Strait, Lombok Strait and Timor Strait to the South China Sea and the Pacific.

Indonesia has a history and culture dating back to the first and second century A.D. Customs and culture bind Indonesia to the Indian and Chinese cultures. To understand the Indonesian Armed Forces role in the country one must first understand the history of Indonesia beginning with the period of the Hindu's to the period of Western colonialism.

The Period of Hindu Kingdom.

Many well-organized Indonesian kingdoms in the past adopted the Hindu or Buddhist religions. The culture and civilization which emanated from both religions synchronized with the local culture and customs. It introduced the

Indian culture and customs such as the system of a monarchy government, military organization, music and dance, architecture and literature like the Mahabharata and the Ramayana epics. The Buddhist brought with them its two sects, the Hinayana and Mahayana, their Sanskrit alphabet and language, which became the formal language in the Indonesian kingdoms. This period in Indonesian history is called the period of Hindu kingdom which lasted until the 16th century A.D.

Ink and paper were already in use in China since the 2nd century A.D. Chinese chronicles described the existence of a kingdom in Java-Dwipa (Java) and a diplomatic relations between Java-Dwipa and China. It also mentioned the existence of other kingdoms such as, Sriwijaya in Sumatra (Palembang), Mataram in Central Java (Jogyakarta) it was described that during this period the Syailendra dynasty constructed the Borobudur temple, Siliwangi in West Java, Brawijaya in East Java and Bali.

During the early 12th century A.D. the Mongol Kublay Khan attempted to invade the Majapahit kingdom that ruled most of Indonesia, he was defeated and driven back. Majapahit was a powerful empire, it managed to conquer the Sriwijaya kingdom (Sumatra) with the support of King Chola from the Indian kingdom and King Aditiawarman from the Melayu kingdom (Malaya). Under King Hayam Wuruk the Majapahit empire became the most powerful kingdom in the history of Indonesia. During this period Gajah Mada, the empire's prime minister, was highly respected and feared. He was the architect of the empire and managed to unite most of the islands that is now known as Indonesia. He administered the famous "Palapa Oath," "I declare not to eat the sacred Palapa fruit, until I manage to unite all Nusantara under the Majapahit kingdom."³

The name "Palapa" is now used by Indonesia as the communication satellite title "Palapa" orbiting the earth. Gajah Mada's effort is now visualized by the satellite which united Indonesia and its neighboring countries.

During this golden period many literary works were produced using the Kawi language (old Javanese language derived from Sanskrit) such as the "Negara Kertagama" that described the Diplomatic and Economic relations between Majapahit and its Southeast Asian Kingdoms. Other literatures were the: Pararaton, Ramayana, Arjuna Sasrabahu and many more which were later translated into modern European language.

The Period of Islamic Kingdom.

Moslem merchants from Gujarat India and Persia (Iran) began to visit Indonesia in the 13th century and established trade between the countries. Along with the trade they preached Islamic religion among the populace mostly on the coastal areas of Northern Java. At a later stage they managed to influence the Hindu's and Buddhist's Kings to convert to Islam, and it started first with the Sultan of Demak. The moslem Sultan then spread Islam westward to Cirebon and Banten and eastward along the northern coast of Java. In the end it brought the downfall of the powerful kingdom of Majapahit (1293-1520).

After the fall of Majapahit Islam spread further east to the kingdom of Bone and Goa in Sulawesi, Ternate and Tidore in the Maluku area. To the north it spread to the kingdom of Kutai (Kalimantan), the kingdom of Pasai (Palembang) and the kingdom of Minangkabau (West Sumatra).

Meanwhile descendants of the Majapahit aristocracy and the religious Hindu scholars retreated to the islands of Bali and Lombok. In Bali the Hindu religion survived. The island of Lombok was later converted to Islam by King Hasanudin from the kingdom of Goa in Makassar (South Sulawesi).

The capital city of West Java, the kingdom of Siliwangi, was Sunda Kelapa. It was located in the present capital city of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta. In 1527 Sunda Kelapa was captured by Sultan Faletehan from the Islamic kingdom of Demak. The city was then renamed Jaya--Karta (great city) and was the origin of the present capital's name, Jakarta.

The Period of Colonialism.

This period began with the Portuguese in search for spices. They arrived in Indonesia in 1511 after their conquest of the Islamic Kingdom of Malacca on the Malay peninsula. They later also tried to capture Jaya Karta but were defeated by Sultan Faletehan of Demak. Portuguese descendants still live along the coast in the northern part of Jakarta and some of their culture and language has mingled with the natives' cultures. The Portuguese were followed by the Spaniards. They spread Christianity and were most successful in the eastern part of the country in the Maluku islands and part of North Sumatra.

At the same time the Dutch also started their venture to seek spices for sale in the European market. They organized and established a merchant trading company, the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) in 1602. To protect the trades of the merchant's fleets from frequent pirate attacks on the high seas, Dutch warships were ordered to accompany them. It was the beginning of the Dutch colonialism in Indonesia.

The Dutch secured a trade monopoly of the spice islands. It paralyzed the inter island trade between Makassar, Aceh, the Kingdom of Mataram and Banten as well as overseas trade. Indonesia was reduced to an agricultural country as a supplier for European spice markets. Jaya Karta was renamed Batavia. Worst of all, the Dutch adopted an open door policy to the Chinese who acted as the Dutch middleman in the spice trade with the local natives. This was the root for future racial feeling against the Chinese in Indonesia.

The Kingdom of Mataram (Jogyakarta) was the last to become an Islamic kingdom. It was then ruled by Sultan Agung, the ancestor of the Sultan Hamengkubuwono X. In 1633, he introduced the Islamic Javanese calendar, now still widely used by the Javanese in comparison with the Arabic calendar. Sultan Agung was one of the fiercest enemy's of the Dutch. He twice attacked the city of Batavia but was repulsed by Governor Jan Pieterzoon Coen, the Dutch Governor in Indonesia. Later during the war of independence one of his great grandsons the Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, followed his steps by announcing his support to the new Republic (he later became the Vice President of the Republic in 1973-1978).

The Dutch, in securing their policy of monopoly in the trade of spices, used a ruthless policy of exploitation of "divide and rule" against the kingdoms that existed throughout the country. They fell one after another under the Dutch control, and then the Kingdom of Mataram was divided into two sovereign Sultanates, the Sultan of Jogyakarta with Sultan Hamengkubuwono and the Sultan of Surakarta with Sultan Pakubuwono as the respective rulers.

However, mismanagement and corruption forced VOC into bankruptcy and on December 31, 1799 all its territory were taken over by the Dutch government administration in Batavia.

The Period of British Temporary Rule.

In 1814 the British came into Indonesia through West Sumatra and they built the Fort of York in Bengkulu (later renamed Fort Marlborough). Holland was occupied by France during the Napoleonic wars in Europe. Indonesia fell under the British rule through the British East Indies Company (1811-1816). Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles was appointed British Lieutenant Governor General of Java subordinate to the Governor in Bengal India.

Raffles introduced partial self-government and abolished the slave trade. He also introduced the land tenure system, replacing the hated Dutch forced agricultural system. The Borobudur and other temples were restored and archaeological cultural research conducted. He wrote his famous book of "The History of Java" in which he described Java's high civilization and culture. He believed Java's culture would always influence Indonesian policy in the future. He also established the Tropical Botanical garden in Bogor which is now a research tropical botanical institute of Indonesia. At the same period a British writer, William Marden, also wrote a similar book of "The History of Sumatra" in 1889. After the fall of Napoleon the British and the Dutch signed an agreement in a convention in London on August 13, 1814 that it restored all Dutch colonial possession dating from 1803 onward to the Dutch administration in Batavia Java. By 1815 the Dutch again ruled Indonesia.

The Period of Nationalist Movements.

After regaining the archipelago, the Dutch intensified colonial rule and sparked a widespread revolt. They were suppressed fiercely or with treachery and trickery. Some revolutionaries were Patimura in Maluku (1816-1818), Diponegoro in Central Java (1825 -1830), Imam Bonjol in West Sumatra and Teuku Umar in Aceh (1873-1913). An attempt by the Dutch to occupy Bali in 1908 failed when they were repelled by King Udayana of the Singaraja Kingdom.

When these regional wars failed, Indonesian Nationalists began to think more of an organized national struggle. The nationalist movements were inspired by Japan's victory over Russia in 1901.

The first nationalist movement was "Budi Utomo" organized on May 20, 1908 by Dr. Sutomo. He was a graduate of the Dutch medical school "Stovia" in Batavia. May 20th is celebrated each year as the Indonesian Nationalist Day.

Other nationalist movements emerged, some had the same goal and purpose for independence while others varied according to their organization's needs.

The organization of Moslem Merchants (Sarekat Dagang Islam) was established in 1912. Their goal was to stimulate and promote the Indonesian business interest in the Dutch East Indies. However this organization of middle class business associations later became a political party. It became "The Sarekat Islam Party" and Haji Agus Salim was one of their respected leaders. He later became a diplomat in the early days of the Republic and was a respected statesman who is often compared to the American Benjamin Franklin.

In 1916 this party held its first convention in Bandung and it demanded a share in the legislative structure of the government. The colonial government responded by setting the "People Council" (Volksraad) in 1918, as purely an advisory council. Indonesian representatives in the council were indirectly elected through regional councils but a part of the other members were appointed colonial officials. The People Council developed into a semi legislative assembly. Prominent nationalist leaders became members, such as HOS Tjokoroaminoto, Dr. Sam Ratulangi, Mr. M. H. Thamrin and many others. Besides the People Council, there was another body "The Council of Indies" (Raad van Indie). Members such as Achmad Subardjo and Sudjono were appointed to this organization.

In 1914 communism came to Indonesia. In 1920 the Sarekat Islam party was split into right and left wings, where the latter wings became "The Indonesian Communist Party" (PKI), under the leadership of Semaun, Alimin and Muso. During the colonial government the PKI revolted twice, first in West Java November 1926 then in West Sumatra January 1927. They were suppressed and this became the excuse to send many non communist nationalist into exile in "Boven Digul" West Irian. Later during the new republic independence struggle

in 1949, the communist staged another revolt. It was repulsed by the Indonesian National Army (TNI) while they were still fighting the Dutch. The PKI members who were still alive tried revolting again in an abortive communist coup in 1965. The PKI were destroyed and disbanded and not allowed to operate in Indonesia.

There were many prominent parties and they caused problems during the earlier days of the republic. Each party had their own goals and ways of how to govern the country and it caused the military leaders to commit themselves into political arena to uphold the nation's integrity.

In February 1927, M. Hatta, Achmad Subardjo and other members of Indonesia's political movements attended the first international convention of the "League Against Imperialism and Colonialism Oppression" in Brussels. There they meet Jawarharlal Nehru from India and many other prominent nationalist leaders from Asia and Africa. This was the beginning of a lasting friendship between Indonesia and India in their struggle against colonialism. India contributed a great deal during Indonesia's independence struggle.

In July 1927, during the time Hatta went into the international convention, Sukarno and Sudjono formed the Indonesian National Party (PNI), which adopted the Bahasa Indonesia as the official language. The party adopted a militant policy of non cooperation with the Dutch government. In the same year an all Indonesian youth movement was organized which united all the youth organizations. On October 28, 1928 in the Youth Congress they all pledged an allegiance; "One Country, One Nation and One Language, Indonesia."⁴

The nationalist environment movement was the beginning of the Indonesian unity for one purpose, the independence of Indonesia. These were the youths who would later bear arms to fight and then build the new nation. The future

Indonesian leaders were born in this environment. These were the roots of the future Indonesian Armed Forces (IAF) leaders and the experiences caused the leadership to function in the military and political areas.

The Period of Japan's Occupation.

Japan occupied Indonesia for approximately three years from March 1942 until August 17, 1945. That was the date Indonesians proclaimed their independence during the vacuum of power after Japan surrendered to the allies. It was only a short occupation compared to the Dutch. At first the Indonesians fell into the Japanese propaganda of "Great East Asia Coprosperity" until they realized it was not so.

Most of the Indonesian youths received Japanese military training (PETA) during the occupation. It instilled discipline and the endurance to face the hardship of military life. It was there they met and learned how to lead and organize small units for fighting. These were different kinds of fighting methods than those received by the chosen few at the Dutch Military Academy and Training Center. The differences in the military training environment and indoctrination caused distrust among the military leaders in the early birth of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) and this reached its peak in the late 1950's.

Indonesian insurrection increased while the Japanese supply lines were disrupted by the allies. Ultimately the Japanese collapsed and they recognized the Indonesian flag, Red and White, the Indonesian National Anthem, Indonesia Raya and the Indonesian National Language, Bahasa Indonesia. It was a fulfillment of the Indonesian youth's pledge of November 28, 1928.

Under persistent demands Japan agreed to hand over the civil administration of the country to Indonesian leaders. That was the golden

opportunity they had waited for and immediately proclaimed independence on August 17, 1945.

CHAPTER III

THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMY (TNI)

My sons the Indonesian National Army (TNI), remember, you're not a mercenary army, you're soldiers, freedom fighters in defence of your country, born from the people, raised by the people and fighting for the people.⁵

General.

On October 5, 1945 the government of the Republic of Indonesia formed the Indonesian National Army (TNI) first named as "The People's Security Army" (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat/TKR). The new republic faced immediate military threats. British forces under General Christison landed in Indonesia with tasks to disarm the Japanese and repatriate allied POW and internees.

Fierce fighting broke out on November 10, 1945 in Surabaya between the British and the newly established Indonesian Army that consisted mostly of freedom fighters. The British lost Brigadier Mallaby and November 10 became the Indonesian National Hero's Day. The newly recruited army of the republic realized the superiority of the British force. They withdrew and formed guerrilla units fighting together with the people's armed groups.

Under the pretext of representing the Allied force and assisted by the British, the Dutch sent troops into Indonesia. Between 1945 and 1949 they had to face two military actions against the Indonesian National Army (TNI).

A feeling of distrust existed among the officers corps of the new TNI and this caused deep wounds in the future build up of the TNI. The military distrusted the politicians, they both repeatedly clashed over strategy. The politician favored the use of diplomacy to bring pressure on international public opinion and in doing so, the military lost ground over territories they had fought and defended. All these past experiences shaped the military leaders and the role they had to play in determining the National Policy.

The Beginning.

Military training for service during the colonial period in the Dutch Royal Army (KNIL) began in 1830. The KNIL personnel at first consisted of 600 European and 37 Indonesian officers and 12,905 NCO's and other ranks. The personnel listed as European included a large proportion of Eurosians in addition to the Dutch. Some were mercenaries recruited from various parts of Germany. The number of Indonesian officers was very small only a few achieved field grade rank.

When the Dutch forces capitulated to the Japanese in March 1942, a few KNIL units stationed in the eastern parts of the country managed to escape to Australia. They were then reorganized into new KNIL battalions. These battalions later took part in the recapture of all the oil fields in Tarakan, May 1945 and Balikpapan in July 1945, both on the island of Kalimantan. Later after 1945, additional KNIL units were created from liberated former KNIL Japanese POW camps. These units took part in two military actions against TNI. It occurred from July 21 to August 4, 1947 and from December 18, 1948 to August 1, 1949. In July 26, 1950 the KNIL was disbanded, their strength totalled up to 65,000 personnel. Some volunteered to stay and join the TNI, others were incorporated into the Dutch Army and sent to Europe. Many others were demobilized.

The career of most members of the Indonesian officers corps such as President Suharto started as NCO's in the KNIL. Officers like A. H. Nasution, T. B. Simatupang or A. E. Kawilarang are the few who managed to attend the Dutch Royal Military Academy in Indonesia (Bandung, West Java) before 1942. The academy is now the Army Infantry Center. There were also others chosen to attend the Dutch Military Academy in Breda-Holland: Suryadarma, Hidayat and Djatikusumo.

The only former officer of field rank in the KNIL and who later became the first TNI lieutenant general and chief of staff of TNI was Major (Dutch) Urip Sumohardjo. He died in 1948 and suffered much from the hostility of Japanese trained officers who resented his advancement in the KNIL. Some of the Dutch trained junior officers received additional training during the Japanese occupation while others joined the underground.

When Japan set up an auxiliary corps, the Barisan Pembela Tanah Air (PETA) for the defense of Indonesia, it consisted of 35 Daidan (battalion). A PETA battalion consisted of 522 personnel. To each battalion a few Japanese officers were attached as instructors. By August 1, 1945 there were 66 PETA battalions with 35,855 personnel stationed in Java and 1,626 in PETA Bali.

In addition to the PETA battalions the Japanese had recruited by August 1945 some 24,873 auxiliary soldiers in Java and 2,504 in Timor, known as HEI-HO. These troops were armed with rifles and performed guard duties under Japan's command. It was estimated that PETA trained at least 70 Indonesians as battalion commanders (Daidan-cho), 200 Indonesians as company commanders (Chudan-cho), about 620 Indonesians as platoon leaders (Shodan-cho) and about 2000 as squad leaders (Budan-cho).

Unfortunately, there were no Indonesians trained for higher positions than battalion commander level. This was the reason why, during the early days, the military did not understand the strategy and diplomacy for a united National Policy. Even among the few Indonesian Dutch trained officers, it was only LTG Urip Sumohardjo the first TNI Chief of Staff who ever reached the field grade rank. He was once noted to say: "What! A country without military force, ridiculous!"⁶

Consequently throughout the years of struggle against the Dutch and thereafter, until Indonesian officers were able to attend courses abroad in

the Netherlands, U.S.A., Britain, France and Russia, the IAF only operated in battalion size.

The army is the center point. The air force and the navy followed the army phases of organization. Both services in the beginning primarily used equipment and facilities handed over and left behind by the Japanese and Dutch forces including military ships and planes. The Dutch military provided instructors, the Netherland Missie Militair (NMM). These were the beginnings of the TNI build up.

The Period of Identifying TNI Role in Nation Building (1945-1965).

The TNI organization and military bases, naturally were based on Dutch military equipments and facilities. The Dutch government in general divided their in country administration into, political, trade and military.

The political center of gravity was the city of Batavia (Jakarta) in West Java. The trade center was in Surabaya East Java. The military center (army and air force) were concentrated in Cimahi-Bandung area also in West Java. It consisted of the Dutch Military Academy (now the Army Infantry Center), Artillery School (now the Artillery Center), Cavalry School (now the Armor Center) and Special Force Camp (now the Special Force and Parachute Training Center). The Dutch Air Force Maintenance Center and Basic Pilot Training School is now a government establishment for Aero Industry, the PT Nusantara Aero Industry, a national military industry. The navy center was colocated with the trading center in Surabaya East Java.

Besides these government facilities, all educational facilities such as the medical school and technical institute, were centered in Jakarta and Bandung. The medical school area in Jakarta later became the University of Indonesia (UI) and the technical institute in Bandung remains as the same institute, it has become known as Institute Technologie Bandung (ITB).

Therefore, Jakarta and Bandung in West Java and Surabaya in East Java have become the center of activities for all students from the military and civilian field from all over Indonesia. This was the main reason why during the early stage of TNI, the Siliwangi Division in West Java became the brains of the army. It was better equipped, better led and also better organized. West Java was then the center gravity of the future military leaders.

In the political environment, there were more than 40 political parties during the period in the years of 1945-1956. The many political parties represented in the parliament were unable to work out long term alignments among themselves. As a result the government rose and fell as rival group maneuvered for short term advantage. Increasingly, the parties came to be seen as patronage machines chiefly concerned with furthering the interest of their own supporters without regard for the good of the nation. It weakened the government and as the weaknesses of the system grew it became increasingly obvious that the TNI had to intervene.

Japanese trained officers often had their own political sympathies. Many of the guerrilla fighters, however, had their own political sympathies. Therefore, many military units had extra military political loyalties and often had a stronger sense of commitment to their unit commander than to the TNI as a whole. It was then not uncommon for the conflicts between civilian political groups to be reflected within the TNI leading to the involvement of military units on both sides. Examples are the Communist Madiun affair in 1948, the Darul Islam moslem laskar action in West Java, and the attempted coup in April 1950 by Captain Andi Azis in Makassar South Sulawesi. Although the movement enabled the TNI to rid itself of its ideological extremes it continued to be divided into factions based on personal, regional, divisional and political loyalties. The fact that all the young officers who had been

thrust into senior posts in the TNI were about the same age, approximately 30 years and thus had youthful immature temperaments influenced their decisions which could sometime lead to a conflict such as happened during the PRRI and PERMESTA movement that almost caused a civil war in the country.

The TNI had accepted the subordinate role to which it was assigned under the parliamentary constitution of 1950. The TNI leadership had been taken over by a small group of military technocrats, most of whom had attended prewar Dutch Military Academies. Some of them preferred to withdraw from a direct political role and to concentrate on molding the TNI into a cohesive and effective military force. They were still very young. Colonel A. H. Nasution the Army Chief of Staff was thirty-one years old and Colonel T. B. Simatupang the Armed Forces Chief of Staff was only thirty years old. At that time, they were still lacking experience and confidence in their ability to tackle the complex problems of government. As military leaders they were willing to leave the government in the hands of older better educated and more experienced politicians.

The TNI apolitical stance did not last long. They soon found themselves drawn into the political arena, not as a result of political ambitions or shortsighted machinations of politicians, but because of the complex circumstances contributing to the fluidity of the power structure that did not allow the TNI to isolate itself from politics.

The first major political crisis involving the army was the 17 October 1952 affair. The army leadership, with the support of successive governments between 1950 and 1952, had been aiming to create a smaller more disciplined and professional force. The plans were resisted by many of the less well trained officers who felt that their status would be downgraded in comparison with the westernized officers from Jakarta and Bandung. When opposition

politicians took up the cause of the dissident officers, the army leadership regarded it as interference in army internal affairs.

The affair showed that as long as the TNI was divided into more or less evenly balanced factions, external political pressure would always be a factor that intervened. During the following years the conception of the TNI as an apolitical tool of state quickly gave way to the older idea that the TNI was the guardian of the national interest with the responsibility to intervene in political affairs whenever weaknesses of civilian government made it necessary.

In 1955 senior army officers of all groups pledged to uphold unity in a ceremony at the grave of the late Commander in Chief, General Sudirman. In June 1955 when the coalition government, led by the Indonesian National Party (PNI), appointed a PNI sympathizing officer, but relatively junior officer as the Army Chief of Staff, despite a number of unresolved differences, officers of major factions joined to reject the appointment. The result was that a humiliated government fell from office. The fall of the government produced an atmosphere of self-confidence and officers became convinced that they could have more political influence in the future.

In early 1957, the parliamentary system collapsed and martial law was introduced. Martial law was not a move by the TNI to overthrow the government. The system collapsed because it was unable to cope with regional military commanders who challenged the authority of both the government and the leadership of TNI. It nearly brought the nation to the point of civil war. In 1956 several regional commanders together with several leading politicians from the Moslem Masyumi and from the Socialist Party in Sumatra (PRRI) and in Sulawesi (PERMESTA) took control of the regional government and succeeded in rallying considerable popular support for their defiance of the

central government. When defiance turned into unambiguous rebellion, the TNI command acted decisively. Similar to the American Civil War, it confronted brother against brother, classmates and friends alike. The aftermath lasted long on both sides. TNI forces quickly occupied rebel held positions in Sumatra and shortly afterwards the rebel stronghold fell in Sulawesi. Most of the rebel force were defeated within a few months but the activities lasted until 1960.

The events of 1956-1960 had far reaching consequences both for the Indonesian political system and the role of TNI in the political arena. The introduction of martial law opened the way to sudden expansion of the TNI's role not only in politics but also in broader fields of general administration and economic management.

Together with the then President Sukarno, a new government system was introduced. The "Guided Democracy" system was initially a means of overcoming the disunity that had become apparent in Indonesia politics. To replace the parliamentary struggle between political parties a new system was implemented in which the president played a central role. At the strong urging of the TNI leaders the president reintroduced the original 1945 constitution. During this period an uneasy but stable balance of power developed between the president and the TNI leaders. Also during this period the Communist Party (PKI) became stronger and the western world regarded Indonesia as a communist country. In 1960 the TNI was tasked to prepare a campaign to recover West Irian still under Dutch occupation. Worst of all, at the same time the government also launched an anti Malaysian policy and a confrontation period lasted for about two years against the formation of Malaysia.

The TNI accepted the confrontation policy reluctantly and they made sure it did not escalate into a real war. The TNI adopted the policy of low level

confrontation. But the anti Malaysian campaign created a condition that permitted a rapid advance of the PKI in 1964-1965. It was made possible by the encouragement from the president. Tension rose and the army leadership prepared to meet PKI challenge.

At the first army seminar held in April 1965 a doctrine that declared the TNI to have a dual function role both as a military force and as a social political force was produced. The doctrine title was "Tri Ubaya Cakti" (Three sacred vows).

PKI failed in a coup attempt on October 30, 1965 but they managed to murder six army generals. It set in train of series of events that culminated in the dismissal of President Sukarno. It disintegrated the Guided Democracy System and succeeded in the elimination of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). General Suharto then became the second Indonesian President in 1970. The army as usual played a major key role in restoring order even though many air force personnel sympathized with the PKI movement. From that time on and for the first time since independence, there was a clear government long range (five years) policy plan.

CHAPTER IV

THE DUAL FUNCTIONS

Military Force Function.

Indonesia consist of islands separated by sea that differ in demography and national resources. Its defense system stresses island self reliance, each must stand on its own. Although surrounded by sea, the defense concept is base primarily on land warfare. To invade and occupy all of the Indonesian islands would require a strong and very large army and a large naval transport force. Logically, defending it would also require a large army, navy and air force but priorities of need in the country's nation building budget allocation cannot afford a large Indonesian Armed Forces.

The Indonesian Armed Forces (IAF) are tailored to a primary role to contain internal subversion and to maintain law and order in the country. The IAF consists of army, navy, air force and national police. Unlike most other countries, the police force is considered to be part of the armed forces. Therefore, the IAF managed to abolish any political party domination toward the police force. The police chief is under direct command of the IAF Commanding General as are the other armed services chiefs of staff. There are 27 provinces in Indonesia, each province has its own regional police chief working together with the respective governor in the province.

As a defense force the IAF has the same conventional role as any other armed forces in the world. A priority is given to policing the country while keeping a watchful eye on any disputes and radical changes in the region that could affect national security and stability.

To deter a concentrated attack into the country, Indonesia must have a large naval force to defend its vast coastline and waterways. It is estimated

that the navy will require an additional 150 ships of various types ranging from frigates to destroyers and submarines. The economy of the country cannot support such a large force. The modest defense budget allocation for the navy for the time being has allowed it to make do only with what is now available. To accomplish the navy mission, it is organized into the naval command and into the west and east fleet.

To stop the enemy en route or from launching a preemptive strike, the air force will need a large amount of fighter planes, bombers and missiles deployed at prearranged and dispersed airbases around the country. Indonesia still does not have the means and the capability to acquire the luxuries like the western world air force. To accomplish the air force mission, it is organized into the Air Command and Air Defense Command, West and East Air Operation Command and Air Transport Command.

Basically the Army Command Structure consists of the Army Territorial Command, Army Strategic Command and a Special Forces Command. To maintain the defense for island self-reliance the army established 10 Army Territorial Regional Commands, each commanded by an army major general. Their areas of responsibility differ according to the overall concept of the IAF defense strategy. A training command is available in every region and trains recruits (basic military training), NCO, Platoon Leaders and Company grade officers. Most Army Territorial Commanders work with two or three province governors in their area. In a state of emergency the Army Territorial Commanders assume command of all forces in their area of responsibility including the police force and the civilian administration. There were many organizational changes made throughout the years to find the right and acceptable IAF organization. The most recent change was in 1985 where the IAF adopted its present organization mentioned above.

Since the beginning the IAF has conducted its own educational system, while the civilians were still struggling to establish their own. Now the civilian education system is more advanced and meets the international standard while the IAF still maintains the founding fathers guidance. To meet the challenges of the rapid technological and equipments development the IAF is reconstructing the standard requirement for the military educational system.

To meet the professional challenges of a future modern IAF it modernized the military educational establishment. Each service has its own military academy. To minimize inter service rivalries, officer basic training is centralized for the first six months at the National Military Academy (AMN-Army). After that all cadets move into their services academy for about two and a half years. A month before graduation they are again (rotated each year) centralized in one of the services academy. The president administers the commissioning oath in a centralized ceremony as officers of TNI.

For higher military education and training, each services has their Combat Arms Training Center and Command and General Staff Colleges. The IAF has also established for further advancement, the Armed Forces Staff College (SESKOGAB) and the National Defence College (LEMHANAS). For comparative studies some students were send abroad to study at various military schools, and vice versa the IAF military school also receives foreign officers for the same reason.

Even in an age of push button warfare and most awesome weaponry in history, the TNI still believes that the individual soldier is still, as he has been throughout history the ultimate key to victory:

You may fly over land forever, you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean for life, but if you desire to defend it, protect it and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Romans did by putting young men into the mud.⁶

Social Political Force Function.

The military careers of Indonesian officers are formed basically through Territorial and/or Field Command. Officers who serve within the Territorial Command are introduced very early to dealing with civilian administrations and political organizations in their respective areas. During their army careers they will usually rotate between two regions. To rotate into more than two regions will put a burden on their families and the IAF budget. The rotation enriches and provides knowledge, awareness and ability to understand the critical areas, its resources, customs and languages. With these experiences they will then understand and be able to manage the intricacies and difficulties of territorial and political problems. Officers in the territorial command are more accustomed with the flexibility of how to deal with the civilian administration and political organizations than those in field command. Therefore, most officers within the territorial command will rise to become Army Territorial Regional Commanders.

The territorial command structure is the training field for officers who in the future are expected to play a role in the social political arena for the IAF.

As a District Military Commander he will be an active member of the district municipal community (MUSPIDA). He will always be in touch with the civilian representatives, politicians, religious leaders, police and other informal leaders in the district and province. He will become accustomed to dealing with and solving political and civilian problems, planning and budgeting activities. He will then understand how and why customs and traditions can and will influence civilian decisionmakers. This experience in serving in the territorial community will enhance his ability to deal with politicians outside the military circle.

During his term as a district commander he can decide whether to remain in the active service or choose to play an active role in social politics. To play an active role in social politics, he will become a "Reserve Officer" (KARYA) until his retirement or called back to active duty. However, if he becomes a representative in the district legislative or executive, must first retire from the service. Some who had chosen the social political path, have risen to top political office rather faster than their contemporaries still in the IAF. However, most of the officers choose to go through the military chain of command before taking an active part in social political arena.

Military leadership was always in demand during troublesome eras. Now there is security and stability in the country, there is a different requirement needed in several areas for the military to play a role in the social political area particularly in big cities. It needs more than military leadership to cope with the new modern complex society now progressing in the country. The military needs added knowledge such as social-political science, public administration, business management and more to better understand the society and to become actively involved and responsible in the community.

Even though the Constitution of the country guaranteed the IAF nomination of a hundred personnel as members of the House of Representatives (DPR/MPR) those selected members must be able to compete with their civilian counterparts in their respective fields. The law also stated that those who are selected must not be in active service. This is one of the many new requirements that the IAF have to comply with. The IAF then must choose the best and the brightest to represent the IAF. In 1985 to comply with the law and higher requirement the IAF selected most representatives from its retired officers who were Territorial Commanders or officers equivalent with that position. They were educated in an upgraded social-political science and other

applicable knowledge needed for their assignment in the House of Representatives.

As an instrument of the state we are the executors of policy, whereas as members of legislative assemblies we are formulators of policy. . . . This distinction must be made.⁷

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

. . . the situation itself resulted in the formulation of armed organizations among people organizations that were not controlled by the government. Here began the creation of an Army with its own initiative, an Army which formed itself on its own initiative, which equipped and armed itself, and which carried out its own operations according to its own desires.

We were careless at one very important moment, that is, we gave first priority to diplomatic and political struggle and second priority to armed struggle. After that we are no longer able to create an Army disciplined enough to accept complete control of the Government and to be used by it in carrying out a regulated and precise policy.⁹

As the country's history pointed out, prior to the struggle for independence all Indonesian young and old alike had become involved in the Nationalist movements. It is understandable that when fighting started most of the leaders of the freedom fighters were youth members of the Nationalist movements. Most of the leadership in the civilian and military field were dominated by the fervor of Nationalist movements. Therefore, it was not a surprise that later during the early stage of nation building, differences arose and political parties influenced individuals. There were no clear boundaries between the military function and the social political function. Events that occurred during that period, forced the IAF leadership to become actively involved in the formulation of National policy.

There are similarities between the Indonesian and the American revolution as most of the political leaders at the early stage consisted also of military officers. However, the experience of the American people that had come from all over the world to build America, had matured on how to build a nation. It decided to build a free nation in every aspect of life with an emphasize for

individual freedom. It created a democracy with a law that placed the military role in the country under the civilian government.

Unlike the Americans, the Indonesians were lacking in experience on how to build and manage a country due to an oppressive colonial rule for about three hundred years. By trial and error that nearly caused the nation to fight a civil war, the IAF found that the possible solution was the dual functions.

Now the atmosphere is different. Indonesia only has three political parties agreeing to build a prosperous Indonesia. It also understood that the country needs leadership and knowledge more complex than was required during the fight for independence. It may take time but steps are being now made to overcome the difficulties and differences for a common goal.

Many Indonesians now are able to send their families to study abroad and as a result they have brought back different ideas, comparisons and they are also more sophisticated, usually western oriented. They are the civilian counterpart that together with the military will build the future of Indonesia.

Our greatest obstacle that I see is the fact that many people accept a western definition of democracy as appropriate for Indonesia. Foreigners, those who are foreign trained, and students in Indonesia who are taught by these western trained academics don't like Dwi Fungsí (Dual Functions), because it conflict with the western definition of democracy. They fail to understand the Indonesian definition of this term which is based on our own historical experience and task which face us.¹⁰

The IAF leadership understands the shortcomings and the changes that must occur to meet the challenge of the modernized future. The military education system, the sending of the more loyal experienced and able officers to do comparative studies abroad is now happening. Will dual functions still be needed by the IAF in the future? While we are in the process of nation building there is still a need of military dual functions but this will

gradually change with the environment and time. It is then the IAF responsibility to make the society understand more about the separate function of the IAF dual functions (Appendix A).

ENDNOTES

1. Mabasad - Setumad, Agenda Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat 1990, p. 56.
2. Ibid., p. 58.
3. Indonesian Department of Information, Directorate of Foreign Information, Indonesia Yearbook 1990's, p. 26.
4. Ibid., p. 29.
5. Mabasad - Setumad, p. 57.
6. A. H. Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, p. 38.
7. T. R. Fehrenbach, Proud Legions, p. iv.
8. H. Maynard, A Comparison of Military Elite Role Perceptions in Indonesia and the Philippines, p. 134.
9. Ibid., p. 119.
10. Ibid., p. 277.
11. Ibid., p. 260.

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2. Fehrenbeach, T. R. Proud Legions, This Kind of War, A Study of Unpreparedness. Carlisle, U.S. Army War College, July 1990.
3. Indonesian Department of Information, Directorate of Foreign Information. Indonesia Yearbook 1990's. Wawasan Global Inc., Jakarta, Indonesia.
4. Mabasad - Setumad. Agenda Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat 1990, Jakarta, Indonesia.
5. Maynard, H. A Comparison of Military Elite Role Perceptions in Indonesia and the Philippines. University Microfilm International 1976, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, London, England.
6. Nasution, A. H. Tentara Nasional Indonesia. Jakarta Yayasan Pustaka Militer October 1956 (was translated into English in May 1963 by Joint Publications Research Service JPRS-19, 185).

APPENDIX A

DUAL FUNCTIONS (11)

Military Functions

Is called the:

1. Defense role
2. Professional role
3. Primary role
4. Security role
5. Role as protector
6. Role as security apparatus
7. Role as instrument of state
8. Role as security force

Is concerned with:

9. Military affairs
10. Nation defending
11. Preventing disintegration
12. Security
13. Protection
14. Discipline

Can be described as:

15. War oriented
16. Authoritarian
17. Stabilizing
18. Oriented toward law enforcement
19. Government oriented
20. Status quo oriented
21. Subordinate toward Parliament
22. Intermittant role
23. Singular role
24. Fighting role
25. The will to resist
26. Universally accepted

Social-Political Functions

1. Socio political role
2. Patriotic role
3. Secondary role
4. Functional role
5. Role as struggler
6. Role as social force
7. Role as instrument of revolution
8. Role as freedom fighters

9. Civilian affairs
10. Nation building
11. Seeking integration
12. Prosperity
13. Development
14. Cooperation

15. Peace oriented
16. Paternal
17. Dynamizing
18. Oriented toward law making
19. Populace oriented
20. Modernization oriented
21. Political leadership
22. Continuous role
23. Multi faceted role
24. Conciliatory role
25. The will to grow
26. Skeptically accepted